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Does the Constitutional Norm of Separation of Church and
State Justify the Denial of Tax Exemption to Churches that
Engage in Partisan Political Speech?
JOHNNY REx BUCKLES*
INTRODUCTION

The inquisitions have begun. Armed with an aggressive, formal compliance
initiative' and informed by vigilant watchdog groups, 2 the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) is investigating churches 3 to determine whether their leaders have spoken out of

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. I thank the University
of Houston for its financial support of this project. I also thank the participants in the
Washington and Lee University School of Law's faculty colloquium series for helpful comments
to a manuscript that previewed elements of the analysis in this Article. I further thank Professor
Samuel Calhoun for insightful comments to a draft of this Article. Finally, I thank my wife,
Tami, for her constant support.
1. The compliance initiative has involved examinations of alleged electioneering by taxexempt charities since the 2004 election cycle. See POUTICAL ACTIVnES COMPLIANCE
INITIATIVE PROJECT TEAM, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FINAL REPORT: PROJECT 302 (2006)

[hereinafter PACI FINAL REPORT] (describing the examination of numerous cases involving
alleged electioneering by charities during the 2004 election cycle); Peter Panepento, IRS
Investigates 350 Charitiesover ChargesofImproperPoliticking, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, June
14, 2007, at 48 (describing the investigations launched by the IRS of alleged electioneering by
charities during the 2006 election cycle). The initiative coincides with increased agency staffing
and attention to the tax-exempt organizations sector. See Elizabeth Schwinn, IRS Takes a
Tougher Stance, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Wash., D.C.), Oct. 12,2006, at 25 (reporting that the
director of the Exempt Organizations division of the IRS has stated that the agency "intends to

be vigorous about investigating" political campaigning by charities; stating that the Exempt
Organizations division has recently added 100 full-time employees and has expanded
examinations of entities).
2. According to the IRS, the "vast majority of, if not all, § 501(c)(3) organization
examinations alleging political campaign intervention" result from referrals to the agency. PACI
FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3 n.3. As of March 10, 2008, Americans United for Separation
of Church and State disclosed that it had filed thirteen complaints with the IRS concerning the
alleged political activities of religious organizations over the past year. See Suzanne Sataline,
Obama Pastors' Sermons May Violate Tax Laws, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2008, at Al. Other
watchdog groups have also reported the alleged political activities of churches to the IRS in
recent years. See David Hanners, Group Questions $2 Million in Loans to Pastor,ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 9, 2007, at lB (discussing the watchdog group CREW); Jennifer Mock,
Flier Prompts CallforProbe,THE OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 31, 2006, at 5A (describing the filing of
complaints by two watchdog groups concerning a pastor's support for an Oklahoma
representative seeking reelection); Stephanie Strom, Watchdog GroupAccuses Two Churchesof
PoliticalAction, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2006, at A19 (describing the filing of a complaint by
CREW concerning the 2006 election for Kansas Attorney General).
3. This Article refers to all religious organizations that operate primarily to foster worship,
religious education, spiritual fellowship, and service as "churches," regardless of their doctrine
or rituals.
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4
place or welcomed the wrong people during the 2008 presidential election campaigns.
Consider the following: In June of 2007, having been invited to address the fiftieth
anniversary of the General Synod of the United Church of Christ one year before
announcing his campaign for the presidency, Senator (now President) Barack Obamaalong with sixty other platform guests-spoke to fellow church members about the role
of his personal faith in his professional calling. The IRS subsequently opened an
investigation of the church's role in the event.5 Two months later, a Buena Park pastor,
Wiley S. Drake, personally endorsed former Arkansas governor Mike Huckabee in his
presidential bid, first in a news release and later on Drake's radio show. A letter of
inquiry from the IRS followed within six months of the endorsement. 6 Americans
United for Separation of Church and State has asked the IRS to investigate several
other churches. One target of the watchdog group is the Pentecostal Temple Church of
God in Christ of Las Vegas, Nevada, which shared its pulpit with Senator (now
President) Obama and whose pastor expressed support for him. 7 Another target is the
Grace Community Church of Houston, Texas, whose pastor endorsed
congressional
8
hopeful Shelley Sekula Gibbs on the pastor's personal stationery.
At issue is whether these churches have violated the conditions of maintaining their
federal income tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
(the "Code"). Code § 501(c)(3) grants exemption from federal income taxation to an
educational, religious, or other charitable organization only if it does not participate or
intervene in "any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate
for public office." 9 Similar statutory language forecloses political campaign-related

4. For reports of the high priority that the IRS is now placing on scrutinizing the political
activities of charities in general, see Bruce D. Collins, A Click Away, INSIDE COUNSEL, June
2007, at 79, 79 ("The word is that these political activity rules are a priority at the IRS right
now."); Jocelyne Miller & Harvey Berger, Problemsat the Polls:It's NearlyElection Time-Are
You Ready?, NONPROFIT TIMES, Apr. 1, 2006, at 24, 25 ("[T]he IRS continues to prioritize

enforcing the ban on political intervention."); Elizabeth Schwinn, Ban Unclear,Congressional
Report Says, CHRON. PiLANTHROPY (Wash., D.C.), Mar. 8, 2007, at 35, 35 (stating that the IRS
"began stricter enforcement of the ban" in 2004).
5. See Obama Church Speech Probed,L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27,2008, at 14; J. Bennett Guess,
Obama's General Synod Speech Prompts IRS to Investigate UCC's Tax-Exempt Status,
http://www.ucc.org/news/obama-speech-in-2007-prompts-1.html. The IRS subsequently
determined that the church had not violated the requirements for maintaining federal income tax
exemption. See IRS Ends Probe of UCC on Obama Talk, Clears Pastor on Huckabee
Endorsement,CHRISTIAN CENTURY, June 17, 2008, at 16 [hereinafter IRS Ends Probe].
6. See Dave McKibben, Pastor'sEndorsementof CandidateProbed,L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2008, at 5. As in the case of Obama's denomination, the IRS eventually concluded that Drake's
church had not violated the requirements for maintaining federal income tax exemption. See IRS
Ends Probe, supra note 5, at 16.
7. See Press Release, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Americans
United Asks IRS to Investigate Nevada Church that Endorsed Obama (Jan. 16,2008), available
at http://www.au.org/site/News2?abbr=pr&page=NewsArticle&id-9613.
8. See Jack Douglas Jr., Group Asks IRS to Look at Pastor'sEndorsement,FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, March 7, 2008, at B7.
9. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). Section 501(c)(3) organizations include only the following:
corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or
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activities by churches and other charities that desire to receive contributions from
donors who deduct their charitable donations from gross income in computing their
federal taxable income. 10 The ban" applies not only to an organization's financial
2
contributions to or on behalf of a candidate, but also to an entity's speech.'
The IRS interprets the ban very broadly. According to the IRS, the ban prohibits
strictly internal communications from a religious leader to church members. For
example, the agency applies the ban to remarks made in a Sunday sermon13 or at an
annual meeting,' 4 as well as to communications from a leader to members in a church
newsletter-even when the leader personally pays for space and emphasizes that the
to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities
involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in
subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
candidate for public office. Id.
10. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (2006). Section 170(a)(1) authorizes a deduction for a "charitable
contribution," which is defined in § 170(c). Under § 170(c)(2), a "charitable contribution"
includes a gift to a "corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation" that satisfies
certain requirements. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2). Such requirements include those set forth in §
501 (c)(3), including the prohibition of engaging in electoral politics. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(A)(D).
11. This Article refers to the prohibition on political campaign participation by charities
that is set forth in § 501(c)(3) as the "ban," notwithstanding that, strictly speaking, a charity
willing to forgo tax exemption and the receipt of tax-deductible donations is not prohibited from
electioneering under the Code.
12. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (stating that participation or intervention in a political campaign
includes "the publishing or distributing of statements").
13. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. No. 1828, TAx GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 8 (rev. 2008) (Example 4) [hereinafter PUB. 1828], available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/pl828.pdf. The most highly publicized IRS investigation of a
church for the content of a sermon preached in its sanctuary involved the All Saints Episcopal

Church of Pasadena, California. For reports of the sermon and the ensuing controversy with the
IRS, see Patricia Ward Biederman & Jason Felch, Antiwar Sermon Brings IRS Warning, L.A.
Nov. 7, 2005, at A1; Alan Cooperman, IRS Reviews Church'sStatus, WASH. POST, Nov.
19, 2005, at A3; Vincent J. Schodolski, PoliticalSermons Stir up the IRS, CHm. TRiB., Nov. 20,
2005, at C 11; Taxing an Unfriendly Church, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,2005, at A22. Ultimately, the
IRS found that the church had improperly engaged in electioneering, but merely admonished the
church formally. See Rebecca Trounson, IRS Ends Church ProbeBut StirsNew Questions, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2007, at Al.
14. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1421 (Situation 6), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb07-25.pdf. Perhaps the most famous investigation of a §
TIMES,

501 (c)(3) entity for remarks addressed to members attending an annual meeting centered around
a speech made by the President of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP) at its annual convention. See Mike Allen, NAACP Faces IRS Investigation,
WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2004, at A8; Lisa Getter, The Racefor the White House; IRS Investigates
NAA CPfor CriticismofPresident, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29,2004, at A23; Is the IRS PolicingFree
Speech?, Cm. TRIB., Nov. 6, 2004, at C28; Michael Janofsky, CitingSpeech, I.R.S. Decides to

Review N.A.A.C.P., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004, at Al 2. The IRS ultimately found no violation of
§ 501(c)(3). See IRS: NAACP Speech Didn'tHurt Tax Status, Cm. TRm., Sept. 1, 2006, at C9.
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views expressed are strictly personal. 15 The IRS also maintains that a church may
violate the ban without expressly endorsing or opposing a candidate. To illustrate,
official IRS guidance implies that hosting a "candidate forum" in which candidates are
asked to address only a narrow range of issues of primary interest to the church may
violate the ban.' 6 Similarly, IRS guidance suggests that a church which purports to
engage only in issue advocacy may in some circumstances violate the ban if it focuses
only on a narrow range of issues of primary interest to the church, rather than a broad
range of issues of interest to the general public.17
Scholars have debated numerous rationales for the ban on electioneering by
charities in general, and churches in particular.' 8 The narrow but intriguing purpose of

15. See PUB. 1828, supra note 13, at 8 (Example 3).
16. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1421 (stating that a relevant factor in
determining if a church violates the ban by hosting a candidate forum is whether "the topics
discussed by the candidates cover a broad range of issues that the candidates would address if
elected to the office sought and are of interest to the public"); PUB. 1828, supra note 13, at 10
(same).
17. The IRS has long recognized that issue advocacy can function as express advocacy for
or opposition to a political candidate. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1421 (stating
that charities "must avoid any issue advocacy that functions as political campaign
intervention"); Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154, availableat http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/rr78-248.pdf (ruling that an organization which widely distributes information about
candidates' voting records on only one or a few issues considered important by the charity
violates the ban, even if the charity does not expressly support or oppose any candidate;
reasoning that, although "the guide may provide the voting public with useful information," its
purpose is partisan because of "its emphasis on one area of concern"). The IRS has found no
violation of the ban when an organization distributes records ofcongressional representatives on
a narrow range of issues, if the distribution is not widespread and is not targeted to coincide
with elections. See Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178, availableat http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/rr8O-282.pdf. The IRS maintains that the following are "key factors" in determining
whether a charity has violated the ban when it engages in issue advocacy: (1) "Whether the
statement identifies one or more candidates for a public office"; (2) "Whether the statement
expresses approval or disapproval of one or more candidates' positions and/or actions"; (3)
Whether the organization delivers the statement close in time to the election; (4) Whether the
statement refers to voting or an election; (5) Whether the statement relates to an issue that "has
been raised as an issue distinguishing candidates for a public office"; (6) "Whether the
communication is part of an ongoing series of communications by the organization on the same
issue" that are timed according to an election; and (7) "Whether the timing of the
communication and identification of the candidate are related to a non-electoral event such as a
scheduled vote on specific legislation by an officeholder who also happens to be a candidate for
public office." Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1421.
18. See, e.g., Eric J. Ablin, The PriceofNot Rendering to Caesar:Restrictionson Church
Participationin PoliticalCampaigns, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETIcS & PUB. POL'Y 541 (1999);
Johnny Rex Buckles, Is the Ban on Participationin PoliticalCampaigns by CharitiesEssential
to their Vitality andDemocracy?A Reply to ProfessorTobin, 42 U. RICH. L. REv. 1057 (2008)
[hereinafter Buckles, A Reply]; Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even a Peep? The Regulation of
Political Campaign Activity by Charities through Federal Tax Law, 75 CN. L. REv. 1071
(2007) [hereinafter Buckles, Not Even a Peep?];Wilfred R. Caron & Deirdre Dessingue,I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3): Practicaland ConstitutionalImplications of "Political"Activity Restrictions,2
J.L. & POL. 169 (1985); Anne Berrill Carroll, Religion, Politics, and the IRS: Defining the
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this Article is to analyze one rationale sometimes offered in favor of the ban: it fosters
a healthy separation of church and state.1 9 The thesis of this Article is that the norm of
separation of church and state does not justify the ban.
Limits of Tax Law Controls on PoliticalExpression by Churches, 76 MARQ. L. REv. 217
(1992); Laura Brown Chisolm, Politics and Charity:A ProposalforPeaceful Coexistence, 58
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308 (1990); Deirdre Dessingue, Prohibitionin Search ofa Rationale: What
the Tax Code Prohibits; Why; to What End?, 42 B.C. L. REv. 903 (2001); Alan L. Feld,
Rendering unto Caesar or Electioneeringfor Caesar? Loss of Church Tax Exemption for
Participationin ElectoralPolitics,42 B.C. L. REV. 931 (2001); Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr.,
On Not Rendering to Caesar: The Unconstitutionality of Tax Regulation of Activities of
Religious OrganizationsRelatingto Politics,40 DEPAUL L. REv. 1,29-39 (1990); Richard W.
Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics,and the PrivatizationofReligion, 42 B.C. L. REv. 771
(2001); Steffen N. Johnson, Of Politics and Pulpits: A First Amendment Analysis of IRS
Restrictionson the PoliticalActivitiesof Religious Organizations,42 B.C. L. REV. 875 (2001);
Chris Kemmitt, RFRA, Churches and the IRS: Reconsideringthe LegalBoundariesof Church
Activity in the PoliticalSphere, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145 (2006); Randy Lee, When a King
Speaks of God; When God Speaks to a King: Faith, Politics, Tax Exempt Status, and the
Constitution in the Clinton Administration,63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 391 (2000); Ann M.
Murphy, CampaignSigns and the Collection Plate-Neverthe Twain Shall Meet?,1 Prrr. TAX
REv. 35 (2003); Patrick L. O'Daniel, More Honored in the Breach: A HistoricalPerspectiveof
the Permeable IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by Churches, 42 B.C. L. REV. 733 (2001);
Donald B. Tobin, PoliticalCampaigningby Churches and Charities:Hazardousfor 501(c)(3)s,
Dangerousfor Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313 (2007); Mark Totten, The Politics of Faith:
Rethinking the Prohibitionon PoliticalCampaignIntervention, 18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 298
(2007); Ellis M. West, The FreeExercise Clauseand the InternalRevenue Code's Restrictions
on the PoliticalActivity of Tax-Exempt Organizations,21 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 395 (1986);
Joel E. Davidson, Note, Religion in Politicsand the Income Tax Exemption, 42 FORDHAM L.
REv. 397 (1974); Joseph S. Klapach, Note, Thou Shall not Politic: A PrincipledApproach to
Section 501(c)(3) 'sProhibitionofPoliticalCampaignActivity, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 504 (1999);
Judy Ann Rosenblum, Note, Religion and PoliticalCampaigns:A Proposalto Revise Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 536 (1981); Kelly S. Shoop,
Note, If You Are a Good Christian You Have No Business Votingfor this Candidate:Church
SponsoredPoliticalActivity in FederalElections,83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1927 (2005).
19. See, e.g., Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 857
(10th Cir. 1972) (opining that the ban is "justified in keeping with the separation and neutrality
principles"); Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity:Lobbying, Litigation, and Electoral
Politics by CharitableOrganizationsUnderthe InternalRevenue Code and RelatedLaws, 69
BROOK. L. REv.

1, 88 (2003) (stating that "separationists appear to be ina clear, if more passive,

majority" in America, and that, for many citizens, "the thought of unleashing churches for allout lobbying and electioneering may be reason enough to oppose any relaxation ofthe 501(c)(3)
restrictions"); Benjamin S. De Leon, Note, Renderinga Taxing New Tide on I.R.C. 501(c)(3):
The ConstitutionalImplications ofH.R. 2357 andA lternativesforIncreasedPoliticalFreedom
in Houses of Worship, 23 REv. LmG. 691, 693 (2004) (supporting the ban because "[c]hurch

and state must remain separate to serve the interests of religious freedom and societal
pluralism"); Shoop, supra note 18, at 1928 (describing the ban as "one of the federal
government's current means of ensuring church-state separation"); Douglas, supranote 8, at B7
(characterizing the ban as "a federal law separating church and state"). One scholar opines that
the "driving force behind the current interpretation, application, and enforcement" of the ban as
applied to churches is the separation norm. Jennifer M. Smith, Morse Code, Da Vinci Code, Tax
Code and... Churches: An Historicaland ConstitutionalAnalysis of Why Section 501(c)(3)
Does Not Apply to Churches, 23 J.L. & POL. 41, 63 (2007).
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Although the arguments that invoke the separation norm to support the ban vary,
one may articulate four major versions. The first two variants argue that the
Constitution subsumes or compels the ban, and the second two invoke the separation
norm to justify the ban as sound policy, but not one that is constitutionally compelled.
Under the first and most extreme version of the argument, the ban is justifiable as
applied to churches because it merely penalizes conduct that the Establishment
Clause 21 prohibits. According to this theory, the separation norm, as implemented
through the Establishment Clause, prohibits churches from engaging in electioneering.
This Article refers to this theory as "Constitutional Hyper-Separationism."
A second iteration of the argument theorizes that the federal government is
constitutionally prohibited from subsidizing electioneering by religious organizations.
Under this view, the separation norm, as implemented through the Establishment
Clause, compels the ban, for without the ban government would be unconstitutionally
subsidizing religiously impelled, partisan political speech. This Article refers to this
theory as "Subsidy-Based Constitutional Separationism."
A third version of the argument maintains that the federal government should not
subsidize electioneering by religious organizations, although it is free to do so under
the Constitution. Thus, exclusively as a matter of sound public policy, the separation
norm counsels in favor of the ban. This Article refers to this theory as "Subsidy-Based
Normative Separationism."
A fourth and final genus of the argument justifies the ban without relying on the
premise that tax exemption constitutes a governmental subsidy. Under this theory,
regardless of whether § 501(c)(3) subsidizes religious political discourse, the federal
government should discourage electioneering by religious organizations via the ban.
However, this view acknowledges that the government is not compelled to suppress
any form of religious political discourse under the Constitution. Purely as a matter of
policy, the separation norm counsels in favor of the ban. This Article refers to this
theory as "Normative Hyper-Separationism."
This Article evaluates each major separationist argument by identifying its most
significant assumptions, analyzing the plausibility of those assumptions, and discussing
the constitutional, statutory, and administrative law most relevant to each argument in
the context of its assumptions. This Article concludes that no variation of the
separationism argument justifies the ban, and explains the most significant policy
implications of this analysis.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL HYPER-SEPARATIONISM

The argument that the separation norm, as implemented through the Establishment
Clause, categorically prohibits religious organizations from engaging in certain forms
20. The phrase "separation of church and state" of course carries a variety of meanings. See
Douglas Laycock, The Many Meanings of Separation, 70 U. Cm. L. REv. 1667, 1700-01
(2003). As used in this Article "separation of church and state" loosely refers to the norm,
reflected in the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment andjudicial opinions interpreting the
same, that government must not, under color of law, sponsor or control the religious affairs of
individuals or organizations, and religious organizations must not possess, under color of law,
the right to control government action.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .... ).
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of religious discourse-such as expressions of support for identified candidates-is
22
perhaps the most extreme view that could be advanced in favor of the ban. Under this
radical notion of separation of church and state, the ban merely imposes a monetary
sanction (loss of federal income tax exemption and sacrifice of the ability to receive
tax-deductible donations) for activity that the Constitution already forbids. In other
words, Constitutional Hyper-Separationism holds that the Establishment Clause
prohibits even churches that elect to forgo tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) from
endorsing or opposing political candidates. Although this position would likely strike
most scholars as highly objectionable, 23 explaining why this notion of separation of
church and state is misguided is nonetheless important. This position lays a foundation
for analyzing other, more plausible, positions in favor of the ban.
The most serious shortcoming of Constitutional Hyper-Separationism is its
assumption that the Establishment Clause can limit the action of private persons and
entities acting completely independently of the state, rather than conduct or speech
attributable to the government. As Professor Douglas Laycock has observed, both the
structure of the Bill of Rights and the text of the First Amendment plainly compel the
conclusion that the Establishment Clause limits government, not private religious
actors.2 4 Hence, the Establishment Clause prevents government speech that advances
25
religion, but not private religious speech, which is protected by the First Amendment.

22. A less extreme variant of the argument is that the Establishment Clause does not
prohibit religious organizations from engaging in partisan political speech, but neither does the
Free Exercise Clause protect the right of churches to engage in such speech. Under this
approach, government is permitted, but not required, to silence election-related speech by
churches in order to advance the separation norm. Because this position relies on essentially the
same assumptions analyzed in the discussion of Normative Hyper-Separationism, see infra text
accompanying notes 119-76, this Article need not separately discuss this position.
23. See, e.g., Dessingue, supra note 18, at 916 ("Although the political activity prohibition
may coincide with the strict separationist view, it is not constitutionally mandated."). Indeed,
Professor Edward McGlynn Gaffiey, Jr. has argued that a statute prohibiting "political
campaign activity by a religious community" would violate the First Amendment's protection of
free speech and the free exercise of religion. Gaffney, supra note 18, at 30. See generally U.S.
CONST. amend I ("Congress shall make no law.., prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]; or
). To argue that the First Amendment protects the
abridging the freedom of speech ....
religious political speech of churches against governmental suppression is to reject the view that
the Establishment Clause requires government to suppress the religious political speech of
churches.
24. Laycock explains this point as follows:
The First Amendment limits the power of government, not the rights of churches.
This is explicit in the constitutional text and inherent in the constitutional
structure; all the provisions in the Bill of Rights protect the people from the
government, not the government from the people. State action plays a further and
unique role in the Religion Clauses: State action is the difference between
government religious activity, restricted by the Establishment Clause, and private
religious activity, explicitly protected by the Free Exercise Clause.
Laycock, supra note 20, at 1671-72 (2003); see also id. at 1672 (stating that to conceive of
separation of church and state "as restricting church as much as state" is to advance a concept
that is "utterly alien to the First Amendment," notwithstanding that "there are Americans who
use separation to restrict churches").
25. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,250
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Certainly, the Supreme Court has held that when government sponsors a strictly limited
forum (such as a football game 26 or graduation ceremony27), the religious speech of a
private individual can sometimes be attributed to government. In such situations, the
government has been held to violate the Establishment Clause by fostering or directing
the religious speech of the private actor. 28 However, when government has sponsored a
limited or traditionalpublic forum-one made available to many users for a wide range
of uses-in several cases the religious speech and conduct of a private actor has not
been attributed to government. For example, in the context of a limited or traditional
public forum, the Establishment Clause does not prohibit the use of school facilities by
private groups for Bible study, prayer, and worship; 29 the after-hours use of public
schools by a church showing films on child-rearing from a religious perspective; 3 0 or
the payment by a public university of the costs of publishing a student group's
newspaper written from a Christian perspective."
Plainly, governmental sponsorship of a limited forum for a wide range of uses
(including religious uses) by private actors has been held not to violate the
Establishment Clause. Accordingly, it is inconceivable that the Constitution should be
interpreted to prohibit government from permitting every person and entity in the
country, including religious organizations, to use the ultimate, metaphysical public
forum sponsored by government-the marketplace of ideas springing from freedom of
expression. When people, acting on behalf of themselves or together through an
organization, express views that are both religious and political, they are merely
availing themselves of the infrastructure of a liberal democracy. Government's
fostering of the forum of free expression to all, including churches that desire to engage
in religious political discourse, can hardly be said to contravene the separation norm.32
Indeed, quite the opposite is true. Were government to prohibit the religious
political speech of churches but not the political speech of non-religious entities,
government would commit a classic violation of the First Amendment. Such action
would be patently non-neutral towards speech and religion. 33 The Establishment Clause
has long been held to require, at a minimum, government neutrality between religion
and non-religion. 34 Moreover, when government targets a religious practice, the Free
(1990) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (holding that a federal law requiring equal access to
school facilities by student groups meeting after school did not violate the Establishment
Clause).
26. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301-10 (2000).
27. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-90 (1992).
28. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 316-17; Weisman, 505 U.S. at 599.
29. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112-19 (2001); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270-75 (1981).
30. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-96
(1993).
31. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 838-46
(1995).
32. Cf Laycock, supra note 20, at 1678 (observing that "some people have inferred from
separation a ban on religion addressing politics," but contending that "this inference is
erroneous as an interpretation of the First Amendment").
33. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249
(1990) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) ("[I]f a State refused to let religious groups use
facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward religion.").
34. As the Court has opined,
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35
Exercise Clause requires government to justify its action under strict scrutiny.
Similarly, censorship of only that speech which is "religious" in nature constitutes
viewpoint discrimination, which itself violates the Free Speech Clause of the First
37
Amendment 36 unless the government can justify its censorship under strict scrutiny.
The desire to implement the separation norm is not alone sufficient to justify burdens
imposed uniquely on religious conduct and speech. 38 Thus, if the separation norm
justifies § 501(c)(3)'s ban on electioneering by churches,
it must find articulation in a
39
theory other than Constitutional Hyper-Separationism.

II. SUBSIDY-BASED CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATIONISM

A more promising theory is Subsidy-Based Constitutional Separationism, which
reasons that the Establishment Clause (informed by the separation norm) prohibits the
federal government from subsidizing electioneering by religious organizations.4 °
Subsidy-Based Constitutional Separationism is based on the following assumptions: (1)
the tax benefits conferred upon religious entities, directly under Code § 501(c)(3) and
indirectly under Code § 170, constitute governmental subsidies to religion for purposes
of constitutional law; and (2) subsidizing the electioneering of religious entities
violates the Establishment Clause, as informed by the separation norm.
Assumption (1) finds support in several judicial opinions, although that support is
qualified, especially in the context of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Perhaps most famously, in Regan v. Taxation with Representation,4 1 the Court upheld
the constitutionality of a provision akin to the ban-the requirement of Code §
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of
religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to
the advocacy of non-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or
religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite. The First
Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and
between religion and non-religion.
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968).
35. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542,
545-47 (1993) (holding that a city ordinance aimed at forbidding ritual animal sacrifice violated
the Free Exercise Clause because it was non-neutral and was not narrowly tailored to advance a
compelling governmental interest).
36. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-95
(1993); Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984);
Douglas Laycock, Freedom of Speech That Is Both Religious and Political,29 U.C. DAVIs L.
REv. 793, 799 (1996) ("The Supreme Court has unanimously held that excluding religious
speech from a public forum is viewpoint discrimination, and not a more defensible subject
matter exclusion, at least where the speaker addresses a topic that could be addressed from a
secular perspective.").
37. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,269-70 (1981).
38. See id. at 270-77 (holding that a public university's desire to ensure the separation of
church and state did not justify infringement of a religious group's free speech rights when the
university had created a limited public forum).
39. Cf.Dessingue, supra note 18, at 920 (stating that "an outright ban on religious speech
would violate the Free Exercise Clause").
40. For an analysis, based on the subsidy theory, of why the Establishment Clause may
compel the ban, see Houck, supra note 19, at 52-62.
41. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
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501(c)(3) that "no substantial part" of the activities of a tax-exempt charity consist of
"carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation. '42 In so
holding, the Court relied on the theory that both federal income tax advantages enjoyed
by § 501(c)(3) organizations (i.e., tax exemption and the ability to receive taxdeductible contributions) are a form of governmental subsidy.43 Similarly, in Bob Jones
University v. UnitedStates,44 the Court opined that Code §§ 501(c)(3) and 170 reflect
a congressional desire "to provide tax benefits to organizations serving charitable
purposes" that serve public ends. 45 Finally, in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,4 which
found a violation of the Establishment Clause by a state sales tax exemption for sales
of religious periodicals, 47 the Court stated that "[e]very tax exemption constitutes a
subsidy."' 4 8 Under this line of cases, the first assumption of Subsidy-Based
Constitutional Separationism seems plausible.
However, this line of cases does not exhaust the relevant Supreme Court precedent.
In Walz v. Tax Commission of New York,49 the Court held that granting property tax
exemption to religious organizations (among other types of charitable entities) did not
violate the Establishment Clause. 50 The Walz Court acknowledged that tax exemption
conferred an "indirect economic benefit" on religious entities, 51 but distinguished this
benefit from direct subsidies:
The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not
transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that
the church support the state. No one has ever suggested that tax exemption has
converted libraries, art galleries, or hospitals into arms of the state or put
employees "on the public payroll." There is no genuine nexus between tax
exemption and establishment of religion. .

.

. The exemption creates only a

minimal and remote involvement between church and state and far less than
taxation of churches. It restricts the fiscal relationship between church and state,
and tends to complement and reinforce the desired separation insulating each from
the other. 52
Walz significantly undermines the first assumption of Subsidy-Based Constitutional
Separationism. Under Walz, to grant tax exemption to a religious entity is not
tantamount to directly funding the religious entity. In other words, for purposes of the

42. Id. at 544-51; see also I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
43. Regan, 461 U.S. at 544 ("Both tax exemptions and tax-deductibility are a form of
subsidy that is administered through the tax system. A tax exemption has much the same effect
as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its income.").
44. 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding the revocation of tax-exempt status from a private
school that maintained an admissions policy forbidding interracial dating, reasoning that the
prohibition violated "fundamental public policy").
45. Id. at 587.
46. 489 U.S. 1(1988) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
47. See id. at 25.
48. Id. at 14.

49. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
50. See id. at 679-80.
51. Id. at674.

52. Id. at 675-76.
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Establishment Clause, Walz rejects any reconstruction of a decision not to tax as the
functional equivalent of (1) a decision to tax, followed by (2) a direct governmental
grant of the money deemed to have been collected through the tax in step (1). The
refusal of Walz to equate tax exemption with a direct grant of imputed tax revenues
merely makes explicit what is implicit in the common statutory approach of not taxing
numerous forms of nonprofit organizations, including churches.
For example, if Code § 501 (c)(3) did not implicitly rely on the analytical framework
embraced in Walz, then the refusal of the government to tax the income of churches
would be tantamount to the direct funding of churches by government with dollars
deemed to have been paid into the public treasury. Further, absent the Walz framework,
because the statutory basis for which a church receives tax exemption under §
501(c)(3) is that it is organized and operated for religious purposes, the government
would be considered to have conditioned the deemed grant to churches upon their
advancing a religious purpose. A government grant of tax receipts to a church, to be
used by the church for whatever religious purposes it may select, is akin to one of the
most egregious types of establishment of religion that the Constitution has long been
understood to prohibit.5 3 However, tax exemptions of church income and property
throughout our nation's history have been common-the rule, rather than the
exception. 54 That such exemptions have not been held to violate the separation norm, at
least when they are broadly framed to exempt from taxation the income and property of
numerous nonprofit entities (including churches), suggests that the Walz framework
enjoys long-standing implicit acceptance.
There is one limitation to the logical reach of Walz. In Walz, the tax exemption
enjoyed by churches applied broadly to many types of entities. Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock 5 5 assigns pivotal significance to this fact. 56 The plurality opinion in Texas
Monthly found a violation of the Establishment Clause where the statute in question
57
exempted not a broad class of products from sales tax, but only religious literature.
The precise degree to which Texas Monthly limits the logical application of Walz is
unknown. However, there is no persuasive reason to question the applicability of Walz
to the federal income tax exemption of churches under Code § 501(c)(3). Code §
501(c)(3) exempts a broad class of entities organized not only for religious but also for

53. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840 (1995)
(stating that a tax imposed specifically to establish specific sects "would run contrary to
Establishment Clause concerns dating from the earliest days of the Republic"); id. at 868-72
(Souter, J., dissenting) (tracing the historical foundations of the Establishment Clause and
observing that it was intended to prohibit direct financial aid to churches from public monies);
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-16 (1947) (discussing the history of imposing taxes for
the support of religion and the ensuing commitment to end the practice inthe anti-establishment
movement that resulted in the Establishment Clause); id. at 16 (opining that a state cannot
constitutionally "contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which teaches the
tenets and faith of any church").
54. See Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 859 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The historical evidence of
government support for religious entities through property tax exemptions is also
overwhelming."); Walz, 397 U.S. at 676-80.
55. 489 U.S. 1(1988).
56. See id. at 11-17.
57. See id. at 14-15.
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general charitable, educational, scientific, literary, and other purposes. Just as the
property tax exemption in Walz applied broadly, so does § 501(c)(3) (and, more
generally, § 501(c) as a whole).5 9
Before leaving the discussion of Walz, this Article would do well to explore why
Walz's refusal to equate tax exemption with a deemed transfer of taxes to government
followed by a deemed grant from government to a church is not only historically
assumed, but also theoretically correct. One theoretical justification for Walz is that the
element of private choice negates any finding of governmental sanction of religion
through the indirect funding mechanism, at least when the class of exempt entities is
broad. Under the typical system of ad valorem taxation, 60 the benefit of a property tax
exemption obviously varies with the value of property exempted from tax; the greater
the value of the property owned by a church, the greater the tax bill that the church
avoids by virtue of its exemption. However, government is not primarily responsible
for the existence or value of a church's property.6 ' Those who donate the property (and
cash used to purchase property) owned by a church, as well as the church leaders and
members who decide how much cash to invest in church land and buildings, are the
people most directly responsible for the existence and value of church property, for
their decisions largely dictate just what property a church owns. The government ha.
no voice in determining what churches own property, or how much property they own.
Of course, the forces of the market also determine the value of all real property,
including that owned by churches. Even so, private persons, including church leaders
and members of congregations, rather than governmental actors, decide where
churches should locate and therefore serve a role in determining how the market will
value their property. Moreover, the market is largely a function of private choices, not
governmental choices. Hence, at least as long as the government imposes broadly
applicable property tax exemptions, the value of the exemption
to churches is largely
62
the result of private choices, not governmental action.
That the value of property tax exemption to churches is largely the result of private
choices is important under the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The
significance of private choice is nicely illustrated by Mueller v. Allen,63 a case
analogous to Walz. In Mueller v. Allen, the Court upheld the constitutionality ofa state

58. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
59. Similarly, the language of Code § 170(c) defines "charitable contribution" in such a
way that donations to a broad class of organizations are deductible. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (2006).
60. "Ad valorem" means "according to value." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 57 (8th ed.
2004). Ad valorem taxes, of which real property taxes are representative, increase as the
property subject to taxation increases in value.
61. Cf DEAN M. KELLEY, WHY CHURcHEs SHOULD NOT PAY TAXEs 32-34 (1977)
(discussing the difference between a direct subsidy and tax exemptions in terms of governmental

involvement; observing that government determines the amount of a subsidy, but does not
determine the value of tax exemption to an organization).
62. Of course, the government does fix the rate of taxation on taxable property, and
therefore the value of a property tax exemption to a church does vary with the rate that would
apply inthe absence of the exemption. This point is of no real consequence, however. In the
"private choice" line of cases discussed in the paragraph following this note, the government
played an analogous role in fixing the amount of the subsidies directed through private choice.
63. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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income tax law permitting a deduction for payments of tuition, purchase of books, and
provision of transportation made to enable the taxpayers' children to attend school,
notwithstanding that parents of children attending private religious schools were most
likely to claim the deduction. 64 One reason the deduction survived Establishment
Clause scrutiny is that the private schools received an indirect benefit through the tax
system "only as a result of decisions of individual parents," 65 and therefore the state
had not conveyed approval of any specific religion or of religion in general.66
Similarly, the presence of a causal link between private choices and the amount of
governmental assistance enjoyed by religious entities patronized by the people
exercising choices has been a significant factor in several other Supreme Court
opinions finding no violation of the Establishment Clause. 67 The Court's opinion in
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris aptly captures the point:
[W]here a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides
assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid

to religious [institutions] ...wholly as a result of their own genuine and
independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under
the Establishment Clause. A program that shares these features permits
government aid to reach religious institutions only by way of the deliberate
choices of numerous individual recipients. The incidental advancement of a
religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is
reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government, whose
role ends with the disbursement of benefits.69
The application of these cases to the tax exemption of churches under Code §
501 (c)(3) and their ability to receive contributions deductible by donors under Code §
170 is patent. The benefit of tax exemption under Code § 501 (c)(3) and the indirect
benefit of receiving tax-deductible contributions under Code § 170 are primarily the
result of private choices. Private, not governmental, actors decide how much to donate
to churches. Similarly, church leaders and members make other choices that have a

64. See id.
at 394-404.
65. Id. at 399; see also id. at 400 (stating that the "historic purposes" of the Establishment
Clause "simply do not encompass the sort of attenuated financial benefit, ultimately controlled

by the private choices of individual parents," that inured to parochial schools from a neutrally
available state income tax deduction).

66. See id. at 399.
67. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644, 652-54, 662-63 (2002)
(upholding the constitutionality of a governmentally funded school voucher program enabling
students to attend private schools of their choice); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509
U.S. 1, 10, 13-14 (1993) (finding that a governmental program requiring a school district to
provide sign-language interpreters to help deaf students did not violate the Establishment Clause
even when a deaf student was enrolled in a private Catholic school; relying in part on the fact
that the choice of school was made by the student's parents, rather than the government);

Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-89 (1986) (finding no
Establishment Clause violation by a state scholarship program that aided a student studying for
the ministry at a religious institution where any benefit realized by the religious entity resulted
from the student's private, independent choice).

68. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
69. Id. at 652.
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bearing on the income that a church receives (whether through donations, church
school tuition, earnings from investments, or car washes and garage sales sponsored by
youth groups). Even when the charitable contributions deduction is conceptualized as a
"matching grant," 70 the point remains that a "matching grant" arises only when a
private actor first decides to donate to the church, and the amount of the "matching
grant" varies with the amount that the private actor decides to donate. It is thus no
surprise that the Supreme Court has strongly suggested in dictum that a state income
tax law authorizing a charitable contributions deduction did not violate the
Establishment Clause, notwithstanding that the deduction likely benefited religious
organizations. 7'
Another theoretical justification for Walz's refusal to equate tax exemption with a
deemed transfer of taxes to government followed by a deemed grant from government
to a church is that any such reconstruction of the refusal to tax erroneously
conceptualizes the normative tax base. As discussed more fully below in the context of
income tax exemptions,7 2 several alternatives to the so-called "subsidy theory" may
justify Code §§ 170 and 501(c)(3) as applied to the broad class of charities in general.
Under these theories, no "subsidy" flows to tax-exempt entities by virtue of their
exempt status because the income in question is not properly included in the tax base in
the first instance. One may similarly argue that Walz is theoretically sound because the
property owned by charitable organizations, including churches, is not properly
included in the tax base. Support for this view appears in Professor Evelyn Brody's
"sovereignty" theory of charity tax exemptions.73 Professor Brody explains that
charities historically have been regarded as limited co-sovereigns with the state.74
Because they are qualified co-sovereigns, 75 charitable entities generally have been
viewed by governmental authorities as improper objects of taxation. From this
perspective, when government "exempts" property owned by charitable, religious, and
educational institutions from taxation, it does so not to subsidize charity, but to
recognize charity's sovereign prerogative to operate free from governmental intrusion.
Indeed, one can even justify Walz more particularly as it applies to churches alone.
Relying in part on Professor Brody's theory of exemptions based on sovereignty,
Professor Edward Zelinsky has argued that the most appealing justification for Walz is
that the value of property owned by churches does not belong in the normatively
correct tax base.76 Zelinsky observes that the nation's founders were "simultaneously

70. See, e.g., Edward H. Rabin, CharitableTrusts andCharitableDeductions,41 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 912, 920 (1966) ("In essence, the present system is a type of matching program under
which the Government agrees to spend a certain amount (depending on the taxpayer's top tax
bracket) for each dollar contributed to charity.").
71. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 396 n.5 (1983).
72. See infra text accompanying notes 92-113.
73. See Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax
Exemption, 23 J. CoRp. L. 585 (1998).
74. See id.
at 585-96.
75. Charities are "qualified" co-sovereigns because, as Professor Brody argues, the state
views charities with suspicion and is unwilling to recognize their co-sovereignty for all purposes
of law. See id. at 629.
76. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits "forReligious Institutions Constitutionally

Dependent on Benefits for Secular Entities?,42 B.C. L. REv. 805, 811-12, 836-41 (2001).
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propounding separationism and exemption,, 77 and he explains this fact by reasoning
that the founders "thought of exemption as a form of separationism, in our vocabulary,
a recognition of sectarian autonomy., 78 Rather than exempting religious entities from
taxation in order to subsidize them, governments "refrain from taxation as a
recognition of the autonomy of religious institutions and undertakings." 79 Zelinsky80
concludes that "tax exemption does not subsidize churches, but leaves them alone."
Although Professor Zelinsky's arguments have considerable force,8 1 this Article
need neither adopt nor reject his defense of tax exemptions for churches in particular
(as opposed to charities more generally). The important point for present purposes is
that Walz's distinction between direct subsidies and the benefit of tax exemption is
defensible on at least two independent bases-the effect of private choice, and the
proper conceptualization of the tax base. Consequently, the first assumption of
Subsidy-Based Constitutional Separationism does not withstand scrutiny.
Assumption (2) of Subsidy-Based Constitutional Separationism suffers from an
internal logical gap when offered as a constitutional justification for the ban. Certainly,
if, contrary to the weight of judicial authority, Code §§ 501(c)(3) and 170 were
properly conceived to impart a direct subsidy on churches for purposes of the
Establishment Clause, serious concerns would arise. But those concerns extend well
beyond the subsidization of the political speech of churches, a point that is easily
overlooked. Consider the following reasoning offered by Professor Oliver Houck, an
adherent of Subsidy-Based Constitutional Separationism:
At first blush, any attempt to separately limit churches from political activity
would seem to run afoul of the neutrality principle and be unconstitutional. The
cases applying this principle to date, however, have involved state support for
educational and other apolitical activities. There is a major difference in
empowerment between allowing religious groups to meet after-hours at a public
school, and subsidizing a church slate of political candidates.8 The
subsidy is large,
2
and the activity goes to the heart of democratic government.
On close inspection, the argument proves too much.

3

77. Id. at 840.
78. Id.

79. Id. at 841.
80. Id.
81. Professor Carl Esbeck supports the same analysis when he reasons as follows:
[Tihe very reason for causing religious organizations to be jurisdictionally
"separated" from government is to reduce conflicts between the two and thereby to
protect church autonomy. The word "exemption" is merely the legislative rubric
for accomplishing that deeper purpose. Religious exemptions from regulatory or
tax burdens do not violate the Establishment Clause-they reinforce the desired
distance between church and state.
Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early

American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1385, 1586 (2004).
82. Houck, supra note 19, at 57.
83. As discussed below, see infra text accompanying notes 117-18, one may also rightly
question whether the indirect government subsidy received by churches is as large as that
received by many other types of charities.
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The statutory basis for which a church receives tax exemption under § 501 (c)(3) is
that it is organized and operated for religious purposes. Thus, as a condition of
obtaining tax exemption, the church must advance a religious purpose. If tax
exemption is tantamount to a deemed payment of taxes by churches, followed by a
deemed transfer of collected revenues from government to churches, 84 the logic of
Subsidy-Based Constitutional Separationism compels the conclusion that to grant tax
exemption to churches is to violate the separation norm. 85 As discussed above, the
when they can
separation norm counsels against government aid to churches, at least
86
use granted funds for whatever religious projects they may select.
To understand the real import of the second assumption of Subsidy-Based
Constitutional Separationism is to expose its Achilles' heel. Its logic essentially renders
moot the more specific question of whether lifting the ban on electioneering itself
would contravene the separation norm. Professor Houck obfuscates this issue when he
contrasts "allowing religious groups to meet after-hours at a public school" with
"subsidizing a church slate of political candidates." 87 In order to craft a persuasive
argument against the ban along these lines, one must explain why, for purposes of the
Establishment Clause, governmental financial support for non-political, overtly
religious activities of churches is constitutional, whereas governmental financial
support for political, religious speech is not. As more fully developed below, 88 the
position is difficult to defend. In the final analysis, Subsidy-Based Constitutional
Separationism is not so much an argument in favor of the ban, as an argument against
the tax exemption of churches more generally.
In summary, the weight of Supreme Court jurisprudence defies Subsidy-Based
Constitutional Separationism. For purposes of constitutional law, a church's federal
income tax exemption and its receipt of tax-deductible donations are not the same as
federal grants for the advancement of religion. If the separation norm justifies Code §

84. One scholar who appears to embrace the subsidy theory has, without expressing any
reservations, analyzed tax exemption for churches as a substitute for government-provided
religious services. She reasons as follows:
Considering the theory for tax exemption, it is clear that tax exemption should not
extend to political activities. The grant of tax exemption is tied to the public
service offered by the entity, service that the government need no longer provide.
The entity stands in the shoes of the government, providing religious, charitable,
scientific, educational, and other services directly to the public.
See Murphy, supra note 18, at 80. To maintain that a church "stands in the shoes of the
government" in providing religious services is peculiar. If the Establishment Clause means
anything, it most surely means that government is barred from directly providing "religious
services." See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (stating that the Establishment
Clause means that the federal government cannot "set up a church" or "participate in the affairs
of any religious organizations or groups"). No constitutionally viable theory can justify tax
exemption for churches on the basis that they relieve the government of its obligation to provide
religious services to its citizens.
85. Cf Gaffney, supra note 18, at 35 (rejecting "tax expenditure" theory as applied to
churches because "under the no-establishment clause, religion is not normally a legitimate
function of governmental planning or financial support").
86. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
87. Houck, supra note 19, at 57.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 117-18, 155-58.
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501(c)(3), it must do so pursuant to a theory articulated in general policy terms rather
than one grounded strictly in constitutional law.
III. SUBSIDY-BASED NoRMATIVE SEPARATIONISM

Although the tax advantages enjoyed by churches are not properly viewed as
equivalent to direct governmental subsidies for purposes of the Establishment Clause,
one may argue that they should be viewed as subsidies more generally, in designing
and enacting public policy. The position that I have styled "Subsidy-Based Normative
Separationism" argues that the federal government should not subsidize electioneering
by religious organizations, although it is free to do so under the Constitution. SubsidyBased Normative Separationism assumes the following: (1) the tax benefits conferred
upon religious entities, directly under Code § 501(c)(3) and indirectly under Code §
170, should be analyzed as a governmental subsidy for purposes of federal income tax
policy and theory (but not necessarily for purposes of constitutional law); and (2)
sound policy, grounded in the separation norm, counsels government against
subsidizing the religious political activities of religious entities. Subsidy-Based
Normative Separationism appears to garner
a fairly large following,8 9 even finding
90
expression in a federal judicial opinion.
Assumption (1) (commonly referred to as the "subsidy theory") is widely held, or at
least perceived to be widely held.91 However, the subsidy theory is hardly the only

89. See, e.g., Murphy, supranote 18, at 79-81; Tobin, supranote 18, at 1320 (framing his
discussion of the ban on political campaign participation by churches in terms of "whether
religious institutions should be subsidized to engage in political campaigns"); De Leon, supra
note 19, at 715-16 (referring to "the subsidization of free expression" and arguing that "the
current political-campaign-activity prohibition should remain on the books as it is written for the
sake of public policy"). Professor Ann Murphy's analysis is illustrative. After analyzing tax
exemption as an indirect governmental subsidy, see Murphy, supra note 18, at 63-64, she
reasons as follows in favor of the ban:
The lifting of the ban is not direct State support of religion, but it creates a climate
in which a church could encroach on politics, and politics could encroach on the
activity of a church. The intervention in politics could turn believers away from
the church or house of worship. One need only envision campaign signs within a
church to see the danger of these bills. Should the faithful be forced to listen to a
campaign speech before they hear the homily? When worshipers donate to the
collection plate, will they have any control over how much of that donation goes to
a candidate for president, rather than to a soup kitchen?
Id. at 81.
90. See, e.g., Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 857
(10th Cir. 1972) (stating that the ban, as applied to a religious organization, restrained the Free
Exercise Clause "only to the extent of denying tax exempt status and then only in keeping with
an overwhelming and compelling Governmental interest," which the court identified as
"guarantying that the wall separating church and state remain high and firm").
91. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution
Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REv. 843, 873 (2001) ("[G]ovemment policymakers have viewed the
charitable contribution deduction from its beginning as an incentive and a subsidy."); Chisolm,
supra note 18, at 320 ("It is nearly as settled, at least in Congress and the courts, that permitting
a section 501(c)(3) organization to engage in election-related activity would be equivalent to
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plausible theoretical justification for the charity income tax exemption and the
charitable contributions deduction. 92 One alternative to the subsidy theory, advanced
by the late Professor Boris Bittker and George Rahdert, posits that taxable income is
primarily a concept of relevance to profit-seeking taxpayers, with little value in
describing the financial activity of entities. The "receipts" of these organizations
typically do not derive from commercial sales, and their "expenses" are not payments
made to earn a profit.93 Although Bittker's income measurement theory may prove too
much, 94 it at least demonstrates that the subsidy theory is not indispensable in justifying
the income tax exemption of charities, including churches.
Probably even more significant is Professor William Andrews's defense of the
charitable contributions deduction. 95 Crafting his case in the terms of the classic
formulation of income popularized by Henry Simons, 96 Professor Andrews argues that

granting a 'subsidy' of public funds for the activity."); John D. Colombo, The Marketing of
Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the
Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 657, 682 (2001) ("[T]he most widely
accepted rationale for the section 170 deduction remains that the deduction helps subsidize the
activities of charitable organizations."); Murphy, supra note 18, at 79-81; Tobin, supranote 18,

at 1317 (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983)); Zelinsky,
supra note 76, at 808 ("Perhaps the most common characterization of tax exemptions,
exclusions, and deductions is that they subsidize.").

92. For a summary of the major theories supporting the exemption of charitable
organizations from federal income taxation, see Johnny Rex Buckles, The Case for the
Taxpaying GoodSamaritan:DeductingEarmarkedTransfers to Charity Under FederalIncome
Tax Law, Theory andPolicy, 70 FORDiAM L. REv. 1243, 1284-96 (2002). See generally Rob
Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations,31 B.C. L. REv. 501 (1990); Boris I. Bittker &
George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizationsfrom FederalIncome Taxation,
85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976); Brody, supra note 73; Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal
Income Tax Exemptionfor CharitableOrganizations:A Theory ofRisk Compensation,50 FLA.
L. REv. 419 (1998); Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable
Tax Exemption, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 1379 (1991); Henry Hansmann, The Rationalefor Exempting
Non-Profit Organizationsfrom CorporateIncome Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981).
93. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 92, at 307-14.
94. Professor Henry Hansmann correctly observes that (i) many nonprofits receive no or
little income from donations, but rely instead on commercial operations as a source of funds; (ii)
even donations to organizations providing services to third parties can be broadly viewed as
"purchases" (that generate revenues to the donees) of such services on behalf of the ultimate
beneficiaries; and (iii) the costs of providing those services would be deductible "businessrelated" expenses of the charities. See Hansmann, supra note 92, at 58-62.
95. See William D. Andrews, PersonalDeductions in an IdealIncome Tax, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 309, 312 (1972) (stating that the ideal income tax must be "refined to reflect the intrinsic
objectives of the tax," and that it is "imperative to consider carefully whether a provision can be
defended by reference to intrinsic matters of tax policy before evaluating it as if it were
something else"). For critiques of Professor Andrews's theory, see, e.g., Colombo, supra note
91, at 679-82; Mark G. Kelman, PersonalDeductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an
"Ideal"Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a FarfromIdeal World, 31 STAN.L. REv. 831,
831-58 (1979); Stanley A. Koppelman, PersonalDeductions Underan Ideal Income Tax, 43
TAx L. REv. 679, 688-90 (1988).

96. Simons defines income as follows: "Personal income may be defined as the algebraic
sum of(l) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value
of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question." HENRY
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a properly conceived "income" tax reaches a taxpayer's "aggregate personal
97
consumption and accumulation of real goods and services and claims thereto."
Andrews argues that if income means consumption plus accumulation, a deduction is
proper whenever a taxpayer expends money for whatever is not personal consumption
or accumulation.98 The former means only the consumption of"divisible, private goods
and services," the consumption of which "by one household precludes enjoyment by
others." 99 Taxable personal consumption therefore does not include a taxpayer's
consumption of "collective goods whose enjoyment is nonpreclusive," nor does it
include the "nonmaterial satisfactions" derived from a taxpayer's mere act of charitable
giving.1" ° It follows that charitable contributions do not constitute personal
01
consumption and therefore should be deductible in computing a taxpayer's income.
Another alternative to the subsidy theory that extends the thesis of Professor
William Andrews is the "community income theory" of the charitable contributions
deduction and the charity income tax exemption.' 0 2 This theory first observes that the
federal government refrains from taxing numerous forms of benefits (provided by
government, business firms, charities, and other sources) that people enjoy. 103 The
theory then argues that the federal individual income tax base properly excludes these
benefits because they are more appropriately attributed not to individual community
members, 1°4 but to the community itself' 10 5 Further, the theory avers that the
community may not be an appropriate object of taxation. 10 6 The community is
conceivably best viewed as properly exempt from taxation because government exists
primarily to promote 0the
welfare of the community (rather than the welfare of only
7
selected individuals).1
The relationship between charities and the community is central to the community
09
income theory.108 Functioning properly, charities exist to benefit the community' -

C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FIsCAL

POLICY 50 (1938).
97. Andrews, supra note 95, at 313.
98. See id. at 325.
99. Id. at 314-15.
100. Id. at 315.
101. In the case of contributions to non-redistributive charitable donees, a deduction is
proper because they generally produce public goods that are not enjoyed by contributors in
proportion to their contributions. See id. at 358-59. Further, in the case of contributions to a
donee that redistributes donations to the poor, consumption made possible by the funds, or
accumulation resulting from receipt of the funds, is shifted from the donor to the impoverished
recipients of funds donated to charity. The ultimate recipients should not be taxed at the
presumably higher rates of tax to which donors are subject. See id. at 347.
102. See Johnny Rex Buckles, The Community Income Theory of the Charitable
ContributionsDeduction, 80 IND. L.J. 947 (2005).

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See id.
at 967-74.
See id. at 970-74.
See id.
at 973.
See id. at 973-74.
See id.
See id. at 977-79.

109. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) ("[C]haritable

exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit."); id.at 590
n.16 ("The common law requirement of public benefit is universally recognized by
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that is to generate community income-and therefore may be viewed as community
agents. Federal income tax law attributes to a principal whatever income is earned by
an agent for the principal."l0 Hence, ifthe principal, that is, the community, should be
exempt from taxation, the income earned by the community's agent, that is, a charity
for the community, should likewise be exempt from taxation. A similar analysis may
justify the charitable contributions deduction."'
The community income theory provides yet another alternative to the subsidy theory
to justify the charity income tax exemption and the charitable contributions
deduction.11 2 Under the community income theory, the charity income tax exemption
and the charitable contributions deduction ensure that "income" is properly calculated.
Rather than imparting a governmental subsidy, Code §§ 170 and 501(c)(3) simply
ensure that the federal government refrains from taxing that which theoretically should
not be taxed-community income.
The presence of theoretical explanations for the charity income tax exemption and
the charitable contributions deduction other than the subsidy theory should give one
pause. 11 If the charity income tax exemption and the charitable contributions
deduction may plausibly be understood not to impart a governmental subsidy to
charities, the first assumption of Subsidy-Based Normative Separationism is erroneous,
and the theory largely collapses.
The second assumption of Subsidy-Based Normative Separationism suffers from the
weakness identified in the discussion of Subsidy-Based Constitutional
Separationism.1 4 In brief, as a condition of obtaining tax exemption under Code §
501(c)(3), a church must advance a religious purpose. If tax exemption is tantamount
to a direct governmental subsidy of the church's religious activities, Subsidy-Based
Normative Separationism logically compels the conclusion that the whole scheme of
exempting churches from federal income taxation violates the separation norm. The
more specific question of whether lifting the ban on electioneering itself would
contravene the separation norm is largely a moot point. It remains relevant only if one
can explain why granting a subsidy under a "no electioneering" rule offends the
commentators on the law of trusts."); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in2008)
("An organization is not organized or operated exclusively for one or more [exempt purposes]
unless it serves a public rather than a private interest.").
110. See Poe v. Seabom, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
111. See Buckles, supra note 102, at 979-84.
112. As has been observed, see Buckles, supra note 102, at 978, the community income
theory of the charity income tax exemption and the charitable contributions complements
Professor Evelyn Brody's theory of exemption based upon sovereignty. The community income
theory helps articulate why charitable organizations have been treated as co-sovereigns with the
state. Just as government exists for the community, so do charitable entities. If community
income is not properly included in the tax base, it is sensible to exclude from the tax base the
income of those institutions that represent and embody the community-government and
charities.
113. A few other scholars have rejected the view that exemption is tantamount to a subsidy
for purposes of constitutional law, at least in the context of religious organizations. See, e.g.,
KELLEY, supra note 61, at 32-34; Zelinsky, supra note 76, at 807 ("[I]t is most convincing to
think of religious tax exemption as the acknowledgment of sectarian sovereignty (rather than the
subsidization of religion)."); id.
at 836-41 (arguing that tax exemption for religious entities is
best understood as base-defining).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 84-88.
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separation norm less than granting a subsidy while permitting the grantee to engage in
electioneering. Any such explanation is elusive.
One may speculate that proponents of Subsidy-Based Normative Separationism fear
that if churches are allowed to endorse candidates, the candidates will be more likely to
aid churches in some manner, thereby tending to establish the religions of those
churches that once supported the candidates."' In order to relate this concern to the
supposed subsidy received by churches, one would need to demonstrate either that (i)
the alleged subsidy received by churches is greater than that received by other
charities, such that lifting the ban would allow churches to devote more subsidized
funding for electioneering than could other charities, or (ii) churches are more likely
than other charities to leverage effectively whatever subsidy they do receive to support
or oppose political candidates and thereby disproportionately affect public policy. For
reasons discussed below, 116 (ii) is at least dubious. As to (i), the empirical evidence
suggests that, if anything, churches probably benefit less from tax exemption and the
charitable contributions deduction than do many other types of § 501(c)(3)
organizations. The explanation is twofold. First, unlike charities that receive a large
percentage of their income as fees for services and/or investment returns (such as
hospitals and universities), churches receive the vast portion of their revenues from
annual donations that would be excludible from gross income as gifts even apart from
§ 501(c)(3).' Second, relative to other charitable donees, churches receive a large
percentage of their contributions from donors who are less likely8to claim charitable
contributions deductions under Code § 170 for their donations."
Because the concern of enhanced church influence over public policy as a result of
lifting the ban likely has little or no correlation to the alleged subsidy received by
churches, the concern is better expressed in an argument against church participation in
politics quite apart from the subsidy theory. To this final variation of the argument this
Article now turns.
IV. NORMATIVE HYPER-SEPARATIONISM
According to "Normative Hyper-Separationism," the federal government should, as
a matter of sound policy grounded in the separation norm, retain the ban in order to
discourage churches from expressing a partisan voice in political campaigns,
notwithstanding that the Constitution does not compel this silencing of churches, and
notwithstanding that the Code may not impart a subsidy to churches through §§ 170

115. See infra text accompanying notes 152-54.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 155-58.
117. See I.R.C. § 102 (2006). I agree with the conclusion of Professor Michael Hatfield that
a charitable organization's receipts from charitable donations would likely constitute excludible
gifts under Code § 102 in the absence of Code § 501(c)(3). See Michael Hatfield, Ignore the
Rumors-Campaigningfrom the Pulpit Is Okay: Thinking Past the Symbolism of Section
501 (c)(3), 20 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 125, 155-57 (2006). Further, as Professor

Hatfield notes, see id. at 155 & n.140, at least one court has so opined. See, e.g., Branch
Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The IRS has agreed with this
position in at least one technical advice memorandum. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 68-121-21
(Dec. 12, 1968).
118. See Aprill, supra note 91, at 845-46; Hatfield, supra note 117, at 157-58.
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and 501 (c)(3). In short, Normative Hyper-Separationism holds that the separation norm
counsels that the ban is just sound policy, because churches have no business entering
politics, and it is government's business to keep them out of politics.
Judging from academic and popular commentary, Normative Hyper-Separationism
appears to enjoy fairly wide appeal. 119 However, the assumptions upon which
Normative Hyper-Separationism rests are not always carefully articulated. One may
identify one or more of the following as likely assumptions supporting the theory:
1. The space ofpublic discourse leaves no room for religious discourse, at
least in the context of partisan political speech. Under this assumption, a
church's positions on political candidates must be banished from the
public square's discourse on political campaigns by all constitutional
means.120 This Article refers to this assumption as the "Religious Speech
Boundary Assumption."
2. People are more likely to listen to the religious political voice of
churches than to other voices in public discussions ofpolitical campaigns.
As such, if churches are not discouraged from engaging in partisan
political speech, then they will have a disproportionately influential role in
determining the outcomes of political elections. This Article refers to this
assumption as the "Disproportionate Influence Assumption."
3. If churches have a voice in political campaigns, then those who are
elected to public office will be more inclined to enact laws that tend to
favor the churches (or the policies supported by the churches) that
supported those candidates. Stated more pointedly: the victorious
candidates may be more likely to enact policies that tend to establish the
religions of those churches that supported the political campaigns of the
victorious candidates. This Article refers to this assumption as the
"Triumphant Establishment Assumption."
A. The Religious Speech Boundary Assumption
A rich body of literature discusses whether religiously based moral discourse in
121
public policy deliberations is consistent with the ideals of a liberal democracy.

119. Several of the arguments advanced by those who adhere to some other version of
separationism identified in this Article rely upon the assumptions of Normative HyperSeparationism. Accordingly, when this is the case, their positions are cited and analyzed in this
Part of the Article. The reader should not infer that I am misclassifying their arguments; I am
simply discussing them in the Part to which they most logically relate.
120. See Houck, supranote 19, at 58-59 (stating that some believe that "organized religion
plays a dangerous role in American political life, and threatens basic principles of democracy:
discourse, reason, and compromise"--and reasoning that religious arguments "are based on the
word of God [and] do not lend themselves easily to debate, reason, or a search for consensus"
(internal citations omitted)).
121. See, e.g., ROBERTAUDI, RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON (2000); ROBERT
AUDI & NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE (1997); CHRISTOPHER J.
EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS

CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS

(1995);

(2002); KENr

GREENAWALT, PRIVATE

RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC

2009]

CHURCHES, TAX EXEMPTION, AND POLITCAL SPEECH

469

Rather than attempt to resolve this debate, this Article undertakes a much more modest
task. It examines whether the current income tax regime governing exempt entities, and
churches in particular, is an effective and appropriate means of confining religious
speech to its supposed "proper" sphere, under the highly contestable assumption that
religious discourse is an unwelcome intruder in political-campaign-related public
deliberations.
The first problem with justifying current law under the Religious Speech Boundary
Assumption is that the ban of Code § 501(c)(3) is an over-inclusive means for
redressing the harm sought to be avoided. There are three reasons that the ban is overinclusive if its justification lies in the Religious Speech Boundary Assumption. First,
and most obviously, the ban applies to numerous types of charitable, educational,
scientific, and other non-sectarian entities, not simply to churches. 122 Thus, a taxexempt scientific organization that desires to endorse a candidate supporting expanded
stem-cell research for purely non-sectarian reasons is muted to the same degree, as is a
church that desires to oppose the candidate for theological reasons. Secondly, the ban
reaches all types of statements in support of (and in opposition to) candidates for
public office, including statements expressed in strictly non-sectarian terms. Thus, both
a university and a church are equally silenced by the ban, even if both entities express
positions on a candidate without invoking the Bible (or some other sacred text),
theology, or even morality or ethics. The third reason that the ban is an over-inclusive
remedy for the problem identified by the Religious Speech Boundary Assumption is
that the ban, at least as interpreted by the IRS, silences the partisan political speech of
churches not only in public forums, but also within the hallowed halls of the cathedral
and the intimate circle of a church family. The IRS interprets the ban to prohibit
politically partisan speech from the pulpit, at official meetings of members, and in
church newsletters distributed to members. 123 Although the IRS's position is largely
illogical, 124 the present point is simply that the agency interprets the ban to apply to the
"private square," not merely to the "public square."'' 25 Whatever the merits of the
Religious Speech Boundary Assumption, the ban reaches well beyond the boundaries
that the assumption contemplates.

SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

(2d ed. 1986);

GOD?: RELIGIOUS FAITH AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

(2003);

MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER
JOHN RAWLS, PoLmCAL LIBERALISM
(1993); Kent Greenawalt, What Are Public Reasons?, 1 J.L. PHIL. & CuLTURE 79 (2007);

Michael W. McConnell, Secular Reason and the Misguided Attempt to Exclude Religious
Argumentfrom DemocraticDeliberation,1J.L. PHIL. & CuLTuRE 159 (2007); John Rawls, The
Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 765 (1997); Jeremy Waldron, Religious
Contributionsin Public Deliberation,30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 817 (1993).
122. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).

123. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
124. When a church leader addresses church members, it is far more logical to conclude that
he or she is speaking "to" the church than that he or she is speaking "for" the church. The
church, after all, is an entity composed of members. When those members are being addressed,
it is counterintuitive to view the message that they hear as a message from themselves. It is far
more sensible to view the message as that of the individual leader. Only when the message is
broadcast in some fashion to the general public, and under circumstances indicating the church's
approval of the message, is it sensible to view the message as proceeding from the church.
125. See Totten, supra note 18, at 303 (stating that the ban "reaches discourse within the
community, where members together discern how they might live out their faith in the world").
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Paradoxically, the ban is also under-inclusive as a means for redressing the harm
that the Religious Speech Boundary Assumption seeks to avoid. First, it is absolutely
clear that the ban does not prevent church pastors and other leaders from endorsing and
26
opposing candidates when they speak for themselves, rather than for their churches.1
Indeed, a pastor can even identify himself as the pastor of his church prior to
proclaiming his position on candidates, 27 and can articulate his reasons in the most
religious of terms. This fact alone seriously undermines the justification for the ban
under the Religious Speech Boundary Assumption. Whether the pastor proclaims his
religiously grounded choice of a candidate from the belfry of his church or the rooftop
of city hall, religious discourse has penetrated the public square. The ban is utterly
powerless to prevent it.
The second under-inclusive aspect of the ban is that it does not apply to tax-exempt
entities described in sections other than § 501(c)(3). For example, organizations
described in § 501 (c)(4) are free to engage in partisan political speech, and they may
do so even if they are affiliated with a church. 12 Thus, members of a church may form
a § 501(c)(4) affiliate 129 and publicly endorse candidates on expressly religious
grounds until they are blue (or red, as the case may be) in the face.130 Again, doing so
infuses the public sphere with religious discourse, and the ban does not prevent it. The
ban simply makes it more expensive, insofar as a separate legal entity must be formed
and must apply for exemption.
Another problem with the Religious Speech Boundary Assumption as ajustification
for the ban is that the assumption fails to justify one rule for political endorsements
(prohibition) and a very different rule for lobbying (permitted as an insubstantial part
of a church's activities). 13' Although churches are not permitted132 to make the special
election 133 under § 501(h), which enables public charities in general to make lobbying

126. See Pun. 1828, supra note 13, at 7 (Examples 1 and 2).
127. See id. (Example 1).
128. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006); Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332. Occasionally, a court
or commentator asserts that a § 501(c)(4) organization may not directly engage in political
campaign activities. See, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir.
2000); Feld, supra note 18, at 936. However, the Treasury regulations state only that the
promotion of social welfare does not include such activities. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)l(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990). As long as an organization is "primarily engaged" in
promoting the general welfare of the community, see id. § 1.501 (c)(4)-l (a)(2)(i), it may engage
in non-exempt activities (such as electoral politics) to some degree.
129. A charity can supervise the creation of a § 501(c)(4) organization to engage inpolitical
campaign activity. See Rossotti, 211 F.3d at 143. Indeed, as one legal scholar has creatively
suggested, a church itself can file for federal income tax exemption as an organization described
in § 501(c)(4) if it is willing to forgo the ability to receive tax-deductible contributions, at least
in part. See Douglas H. Cook, The PoliticallyActive Church, 35 LoY. U. CHi. L.J. 457, 473-74
(2004).
130. The only limitation is that the political-campaign-related activities must not be so
extensive that the entity is no longer operated primarily for purposes not described in §
501(c)(4).
131. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
132. See I.R.C. § 501(h)(5)(A).
133. See I.R.C. § 501(h)(3).
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expenditures within quantitatively determined ceilings,134 churches are perfectly free to
attempt to influence legislation (through both grass roots lobbying and direct appeals to5
legislative bodies) under the less quantitatively precise "insubstantial part" test.13
Further, churches can cast their appeals for the adoption or repeal of legislation in as
religiously charged language as they desire without incurring tax penalties. Plainly, this
more permissive rule for lobbying under § 501(c)(3) seriously undermines the position
that the Religious Speech Boundary Assumption justifies the ban of § 501 (c)(3).
Aside from its over- and under-inclusiveness, the Religious Speech Boundary
Assumption is suspect for another reason, even if one assumes, arguendo, that its vision
of a public sphere devoid of religiously grounded discourse is optimal. The Religious
Speech Boundary Assumption serves as a possible justification for the ban only if one
also embraces the premise that purging the public sphere of religiously grounded
discourse is the proper domain of government. As citizens of a country committed to
fundamental freedoms, including the free exercise of religion and freedom of speech,
we should closely scrutinize any premise that government has an interest in squelching
the speech of private actors-whether or not it is religiously grounded, and perhaps
especially when it is religiously grounded.1 36 In general, the ability to speak freely in
the political process is a core First Amendment value. 3 7 When this speech is
understood by the speaker to comprise an element of the speaker's religious faith, the
ability to engage in this speech is no less a core First Amendment value; 138the speaker
is exercising the freedom of expression and freely exercising the speaker's religion.
Certainly, the Court has upheld the constitutionality of certain types of restrictions on
electioneering communications. 39 But these restrictions have nothing to do with the
perspective of the speaker, nor could they under constitutional law. Governmental
interference with speech must remain viewpoint neutral. 140
Indeed, to enlist government to suppress public political speech on account of its
religious content offends not only free speech norms but also the very separation norm

134. See I.R.C. §§ 501(h)(l)-(2).
135. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) (as amended in 2008) (stating that an
organization is not disqualified from § 501(c)(3) "merely because it advocates, as an
insubstantial part of its activities, the adoption or rejection of legislation").
136. See Laycock, supra note 36, at 798 ("Speech that is both religious and political is at the
core of two clauses; it is at the highly protected core of the First Amendment for multiple
reasons."); cf Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990) (observing that the First
Amendment may prohibit application of a neutral, generally applicable law when the private
action in question involves both the exercise of religion and speech).
137. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) (per curiam).
138. Cf Rosenberger v. Rector &Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830-35 (1995)
(opining that viewpoint discrimination includes attempts to exclude theologically phrased
speech from the marketplace of ideas); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,269 (1981) (holding
that religious worship and speech are forms of speech and association protected by the First
Amendment).
139. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654-55 (1990)
(upholding state restrictions on independent expenditures of corporations expressly advocating
or opposing candidates for elective state office).
140. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-95
(1993); Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984).
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supposedly advanced by Normative Hyper-Separationism. 14 1 It is one thing to argue
that churches should restrain themselves in discussions of public policy matters; it is
quite another to argue that government should do the restraining. The zealous attempt
to prevent the intrusion of religion into governmental affairs via the ban perversely
violates the separation norm by sanctioning the intrusion of government into religious
affairs. 142 To justify the ban on such grounds is to commission government to muzzle
the mouths of churches so that they say only what government thinks they should sayeven if their religious faith compels them to speak boldly and directly to issues
(including elections) that have both religious and political significance. 43 In contrast,
the separation norm supports the position that churches, not government, should
determine the propriety of their speech.
Nor must one of the actors-government or religious institutions-inevitably accept
intrusion from the other. When government penalizes religious speech in the public
square through the tax system in an attempt to limit the religious voice in accordance
with what government believes is religion's proper scope, it employs the coercive force
of law. 144 But when the religious voice is allowed to define itself (imagine that!) such
that at times it resounds in the public square, at most that voice will influence private
actors, who can choose whether to heed the religious voice. In other words, the
religious voice is powerless to compel government action. The religious voice can
merely persuade. Hence, the separation norm poses no real dilemma that forces either
the government or religion to yield its rightful territory to the other.
That the ban offends the separation norm perhaps becomes most apparent when one
comprehends the entanglement of government and churches resulting from the ban. As
the Court observed in Walz, one justification for exempting from taxation the property
owned by churches is that doing so reduces at least some inevitable conflicts between

141. As Justice Brennan once stated, the Establishment Clause "may not be used as a sword
to justify repression of religion or its adherents from any aspect of public life." McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring).
142. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION

70 (2000) (stating that "the effort to use law to reign in the speech of clergy runs
counter to the origin and core meaning of the separation of church and state"); Buckles, A Reply,
supra note 18, at 1086-87. Similarly, Professor Esbeck has argued that a governmental decision
"to leave religion alone" does not establish religion, but instead reinforces the separation of
IN POLnIcs

church and state. Carl H. Esbeck, "Playin the Joints Between the Religion Clauses" andOther
Supreme Court Catachreses,34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1331, 1332 (2006).

143. That many churches so understand their mission is plain. See, e.g., Vaughn E. James,
The African-American Church,PoliticalActivity, and Tax Exemption, 37 SETON HALL L. REv.

371, 396-401 (2007) (describing the crucial role of political involvement in African-American
churches).
144. Professor Stephen Carter colorfully states the point as follows:
Imagine ... a state so insecure and, at the same time, so totalitarian, so determined
to invest every comer of society with a single, state-imposed vision of right and
wrong, that it actually doles out benefits to those churches that preach the right
messages and denies those benefits to churches that preach the wrong ones....
The nation I describe is the United States of America ....
CARTER, supra note 142, at 67; see also Lee, supranote 18, at 434 (stating that the Code "pays
churches through tax-exempt status to be silent on issues deemed by the state to be political").
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churches and government.14 5 The same may be said of income tax exemption.
However, both taxation and exemption require a degree of governmental involvement
in the life of a church.'4 Cognizant of this fact, the Court in Walz stated that, in
determining the constitutionality of either tax exemption or taxation of churches, the
issues are whether the governmental involvement "is excessive, and whether it is a
continuing one calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to an
impermissible degree of entanglement." 147 The ban requires odious entanglement
between church and state. As interpreted by the IRS, the ban requires the agency to
monitor and decide such matters as whether a pastor is speaking on behalf of himself or
on behalf of a church; 148 whether a sermon or newsletter discussing pressing moral
issues of the day is really a disguised endorsement of a candidate;' 49 whether a forum
for candidates sponsored by a church features a sufficient breadth of questions;' 50 and
whether a church has invited a public figure to speak in a "candidate" or in a "noncandidate" capacity.' 51 Policing these messages and invitations to speak never ends,
and it theoretically requires the agency to scrutinize every word of a sermon and to
monitor every guest in a pulpit. The entanglement is severe.
For all of these reasons-regardless of whether one believes that religiously based
moral discourse in public policy deliberations is consistent with the ideals of a liberal
democracy-it is doubtful that the Religious Speech Boundary Assumption justifies the
ban. Before one accepts Normative Hyper-Separationism, one must locate a foundation
firmer than the Religious Speech Boundary Assumption.
B. The DisproportionateInfluence Assumption
An independent assumption that may support Normative Hyper-Separationism is the
Disproportionate Influence Assumption. Under this assumption, if churches are not
discouraged from engaging in partisan political speech, then they will have a
disproportionately influential role in determining the outcomes ofpolitical elections. In
the worst-case scenario, churches will decide who wins elections.152 Under this view, §
53
501 (c)(3) is necessary to ensure that churches do not dominate the political process.1
The Disproportionate Influence Assumption has some intuitive appeal. Many people
respect the views of their churches and church leaders greatly. Indeed, many religious

145. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970) ("Granting tax exemptions to
churches necessarily operates to afford an indirect economic benefit and also gives rise to some,
but yet a lesser, involvement than taxing them.").
146. See id.
147. Id. at 675.
148. See PUB. 1828, supra note 13, at 7.
149. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1421.
150. See Pun. 1828, supra note 13, at 10.
151. See id. at 10-12.
152. Cf Houck, supra note 19, at 61 (opining that "separating churches from political
activity was probably axiomatic" to the founders and that "funding religious organizations to
elect the state's legislature would be about the most counter-intuitive step imaginable" in
ensuring the anti-establishment of religion).
153. That churches should not dominate the political process explains in part why some
commentators favor the ban. See, e.g., Tobin, supra note 18, at 1326-29.
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citizens probably value the opinions of certain religious leaders more than they value
those of any other person. Thus, one must at least recognize the possibility that if
churches are not prohibited by § 501(c)(3) from supporting or opposing candidates for
4
public office, then they will wield a heightened influence in the political process.1
Although the Disproportionate Influence Assumption is at least plausible, the better
view is that removing the ban will probably not lead to church domination of the
electoral process, for several reasons. First, in the absence of the ban, one would not
expect churches in this country to unite behind the same candidate or candidates.
American churches are extremely theologically diverse. One would expect churches to
have a wide variety of opinions on which candidates should be elected.' Hence, while
lifting the ban may increase the ability of a church to influence voters who are
theologically aligned with that church, lifting the ban would do the same for a church
holding different theological positions and supporting different candidates.5 6 Given
the pluralistic state of religion in America, lifting the ban would not likely dramatically
enhance the ability of religious institutions as a class to shape electoral outcomes.
Moreover, were the ban lifted, the entire classof charitable,religious,educational,
scientific, literary,andother organizationsdescribedin § 501(c)(3) would be as free
as churches to endorse or oppose candidates. Just as lifting the ban may increase the
ability of a church to influence voters who are theologically aligned with that church,
so also may lifting the ban enable a non-sectarian charity to influence voters who are
aligned with the educational, scientific, or philanthropic mission of that charity.
Further, the charitable sector as a whole is notably pluralistic in its visions and
constituencies. 57 The highly diverse group of non-sectarian § 501 (c)(3) entities would

154. See Houck, supra note 19, at 59 (observing the danger of "an electorate preparedindeed commanded in some churches-to vote by faith").
155. Gaffney, supra note 18, at 37 ("Exempt religious organizations by no means agree with
one another about many of the issues on today's political agenda .... "). Steffen Johnson has
nicely stated the point:
Some might fear that widening the doorway to churches' involvement in politics
would tilt the public debate in a certain direction-skewing it, for example, in
favor of either the Reverend Jesse Jackson or those who make up the "religious
right." Such concerns seem unfounded. Churches' views on political matters, and
their approach to expressing them, vary widely.... [T]here is a healthy pluralism
of approaches to involvement in politics in American churches-but remarkable
agreement on the fact that faith has something to say about the policies and the
people who appear on the political stage.
Johnson, supra note 18, at 884-85.
156. Cf Totten, supra note 18, at 308 (stating that "the broad range of political viewpoints
expressed from pulpits.., dilutes any claim that a taxpayer is subsidizing a particular position
she finds objectionable").
157. See Elizabeth T. Boris, The Nonprofit Sector in the 1990s, in PHILANTHROPY AND THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR IN A CHANGING AMERICA 1 (Charles T. Clotfelter & Thomas Ehrlich eds.,
1999); David A. Brennen, A Diversity Theory ofCharitableTax Exemption-BeyondEfficiency,
Through CriticalRace Theory, Toward Diversity, 4 Prrr. TAX REV. 1, 24 (2006) (stating that

"the charitable tax exemption allows for diversity and experimentation that often lead to
production of undiscovered values"); Johnny Rex Buckles, Reforming the Public Policy
Doctrine,53 U. KAN. L. REV. 397, 463-66 (2005); Albert M. Sacks, The Role of Philanthropy:
An InstitutionalView, 46 VA. L. REV. 516, 524 (1960).
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therefore tend to compete with religious institutions in swaying voters in the absence of
the ban.
There is, however, another, and probably the most compelling, reason to question
the Disproportionate Influence Assumption. Current law already provides ample
opportunities for religious leaders to influence voters. As observed previously, 158 §
501(c)(3) does not prevent a religious leader, such as a pastor or bishop, from
personally endorsing or opposing a candidate for public office. Such endorsements are
common. And for many prospective voters who highly regard a religious leader, what
matters most is the viewpoint of the beloved religious leader as to whom should be
elected, not the official viewpoint of the leader's church (were it to adopt any such
viewpoint). Because the law permits church leaders to endorse and oppose political
candidates as long as they do not use church resources in doing so or purport to speak
for the church, it is unlikely that removing the ban would significantly increase the
influence these leaders wield in the political process.
One should recognize that, were the ban lifted, the ability of a religious leader to
publicize his or her religiously grounded political views by exploiting the resources of
the church, for example, through the church's Web page or through radio and
television broadcasts of sermons, would increase. However, a leader who is inclined to
utilize church resources for these purposes is already likely to exploit numerous
opportunities permitted by current law to publicize his or her views. Examples include
press releases, appearances in neutral broadcast media for interviews, and the use of§
501 (c)(4) affiliates of the church. Although relaxing the ban would enhance the ease
with which a vocal religious leader could take his or her message to the masses, it is far
from clear that relaxing the ban would significantly increase the influence that he or
she already commands under existing law. Moreover, the leaders of churches with
different theological perspectives, as well as the leaders of non-sectarian charities,
would be equally capable of using institutional resources to publicize the leaders'
political preferences.
Finally, like the Religious Speech Boundary Assumption, the Disproportionate
Influence Assumption fails to justify one rule for political endorsements (prohibition)
and a more lenient rule for lobbying (permitted as an insubstantial part of a church's
activities). If churches are likely to dominate the electoral process in the absence ofthe
ban, why are they not likely to dominate the legislative process in the absence of a
prohibition on lobbying? Indeed, if anything, one may plausibly argue that endorsing
political candidates is more innocuous than lobbying, because lobbying often involves
a closer nexus between church and state than electioneering. A church that engages in
direct lobbying is attempting to persuade public policymakers themselves. In contrast,
a church that endorses or opposes a political candidate is just attempting to persuade
individual voters, who will exercise their own choices in electing candidates
responsible for enacting public policy.
In summary, Normative Hyper-Separationism may find modestly greater support in
the Disproportionate Influence Assumption than in the Religious Speech Boundary
Assumption. However, the diversity of churches in America, the presence of a highly
pluralistic, non-sectarian charitable sector, and the channels already available to
religious leaders under current law for expressing political preferences all suggest that

158. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
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the Disproportionate Influence Assumption should be viewed with no small measure of
skepticism.
C. Triumphant EstablishmentAssumption
A third possible assumption supporting Normative Hyper-Separationism is the
Triumphant Establishment Assumption. Under this assumption, if churches have a
voice in political campaigns, those who are elected to public office will be more
inclined to enact laws that tend to favor the churches (or the policies supported by the
churches) that supported those candidates. Stated more pointedly, the victorious
candidates may be more likely to enact policies that tend to establish the religious
viewpoints of those churches that supported the political campaigns of the victorious
candidates. 159
There are two possible explanations for this propensity for establishment. One
explanation is that, were churches permitted to dominate the political process,
presumably they would be empowered to help elect public officials who are more
inclined to implement public policies favored by churches (such as laws defining
160
marriage, enhanced spending for the poor, or laws restricting late-term abortions).
Of course, for the reasons discussed above, 161 this explanation suffers from the
implausibility of its premise that removing the ban would enable churches to dominate
the political process. An alternative explanation, and the one that this Article examines
in this Part, is that victorious candidates will "reward" the churches that supported the
candidates by enacting policies favored by the churches. This explanation essentially
recognizes that victorious candidates are in the habit of keeping their constituents
happy.
One weakness in the Triumphant Establishment Assumption is its failure to reflect
that the Establishment Clause already protects against the most blatant forms of
establishments that might otherwise become law. 62 For example, if a group of large
churches favoring state-sponsored prayer in schools publicly endorsed a gubernatorial
candidate who prevailed in the state's general election, it does not necessarily follow
that schoolchildren across the state would long be petitioning the Almighty en masse
before the watchful eyes of their homeroom teachers. Even if the newly elected
governor convinced state legislators to enact a state law compelling school-sponsored
163
prayer, the courts would summarily strike down the law as unconstitutional.
Advancing the Triumphant Establishment Assumption to justify the ban under

159. For a similar argument, see Tobin, supra note 18, at 1323-24. For a response to that
argument, see Buckles, A Reply, supra note 18, at 1097-98.
160. Cf Houck, supra note 19, at 60 (speculating that, in the absence of the ban, legislators
may become "beholden to (or intimidated by)" a church that dominates regional politics).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 155-58.
162. See Buckles, A Reply, supra note 18, at 1094.
163. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (holding that the practice of
inviting a minister or rabbi to pray at public school graduation ceremonies violates the
Establishment Clause); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59-60 (1985) (holding that a public
school-sponsored moment of silence for meditation or prayer was unconstitutional under the
facts indicating state endorsement of prayer); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962)
(holding that public schools may not recite a daily prayer to students).

2009]

CHURCHES, TAX EXEMPTION,AND POLITCAL SPEECH

477

Normative Hyper-Separationism is sensible only ifone believes that the Establishment
Clause is incapable of sufficiently implementing the separation norm.
A second problem with the Triumphant Establishment Assumption is that it may
confuse causation with coincidence. As suggested above, one premise of the
assumption is that successful candidates will likely reward churches that supported
them by enacting policies favored by the churches. But it is not necessarily true that the
support that candidates have received from churches would function as a causal factor
in the enactment of church-favored policies. One should anticipate that a church (or at
least its leaders) may support a candidate precisely because such candidate is
campaigning on a platform with which the church (or its leadership) agrees. In such
cases, the successful candidate will likely strive to implement that platform once he or
she is elected. However, the candidate may do so not because of a desire to "reward"
political allies, but because the platform is what the candidate has long believed to be
in the best interest of the country. In other words, church leaders may indeed support
candidates because of the policy agenda already embraced by the candidates, but it
does not follow that the successful candidate's policy agenda was in any meaningful
degree influenced by the political support of churches. Whatever propensity for
"establishment" exists is not necessarily causally related to the support received from
churches. Only if churches, in the absence of the ban, would wield enhanced political
clout is the link between church involvement in elections and establishment
tenable. As
164
this Article has previously argued, this prospect is highly contestable.
A third problem with the Triumphant Establishment Assumption is that it, like the
Religious Speech Boundary Assumption and the Disproportionate Influence
Assumption, fails to justify one rule for political endorsements (prohibition) and a very
different rule for lobbying (permitted as an insubstantial part of a church's activities).
Even with the ban, churches are free to lobby to some degree for laws that they believe
are just, moral, or otherwise sound. One suspects that a church that chooses to lobby
will often be supporting the pet legislative project of a politician currently in office. A
politician inclined to look with favor upon a church that endorses the politician in a
campaign is probably also inclined to look with favor on a church that has supported
the legislative agenda of that politician. If there is a risk that a politician would reward
campaign supporters through policies that tend to establish the religion of his
supporters, current law already tolerates the similar risk that a politician will reward his
"legislation supporters" in a similar manner. By permitting lobbying by churches, the
current statutory framework is at least partially incoherent under the Triumphant
Establishment Assumption.
A fourth major problem with the Triumphant Establishment Assumption is similar
to the third. Under the reasonable assumption that many of the public policies that a
church would favor on theological grounds are also favored by the church's leaders
(such as bishops, rabbis or pastors), current law already poses the same type of risk
imagined under the Triumphant Establishment Assumption. Under current law, a
church leader can oppose and endorse candidates publicly, forcefully, and in
theologically grounded language, as long as the leader does so on his or her own behalf
and without using the resources of the church. 165 Surely reasonable minds can agree

164. See supra text accompanying notes 155-58.
165. See PuB. 1828, supra note 13, at 7 (Example 2).
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that a candidate for public office will be nearly as grateful for a strong, public
endorsement from the leader of an esteemed church as he or she would be for a like
endorsement from the church body itself166 And if a church and its leaders generally
favor the same public policies with theological implications, the risk that a politician
would "reward" supportive church leaders by enacting the public policies favored by
the leaders and their churches is present even under current law. Existing law does little
to remove any incentive that a politician may have to influence the enactment of
legislation intended to "reward" those who are theologically aligned with their leaders
who have supported the politician. The ban simply does not effectively guard against
the risk perceived under the Triumphant Establishment Assumption.
Finally, existing Supreme Court jurisprudence should at least give us pause when
assessing whether the general thrust of the Triumphant Establishment Assumption is
tenable. In its most pointed form, the assumption posits that, in the absence of the ban,
victorious candidates would be inclined to enact public policies that tend to establish
the religions of those churches that supported the political campaigns of the victorious
candidates. The rationale of at least one Supreme Court opinion is to the contrary.
In McDaniel v. Paty, an ordained minister who had been elected as a delegate to a
state constitutional convention was subsequently disqualified from so serving under a
state law disqualifying clergy from such public service. 167 The Paty Court found that
the state law violated the minister's right to free exercise of religion under the First
Amendment. 68 Writing for a plurality, 169 Chief Justice Burger traced the
disqualification of ministers from legislative office from its historical roots in England
70
through thirteen American states (including seven of the original states of the union).1
Although the clergy-disqualification statutes were once considered rational by some
commentators on anti-establishment grounds,' 71 the plurality found that the state law in
question had burdened the minister's free exercise of religion. 172 The state had required
the minister to forfeit his right to serve as such as a condition for exercising the right to
seek and hold public office. 173 For purposes of evaluating the Triumphant
Establishment Assumption, what is most important is that the plurality opinion utterly
rejected the anti-establishment justification for the law:
The essence of the rationale underlying the Tennessee restriction on ministers is
that if elected to public office they will necessarily exercise their powers and
influence to promote the interests of one sect or thwart the interests of another,

166. As Professor Allan Samansky has written, when a minister believes that the theological
tenets of a religious body compel voting a certain way, the minister's "communication of that
conclusion to her congregants has the authority of her position and learning." Allan J.
Samansky, Tax Consequences when Churches Participatein PoliticalCampaigns, 5 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 145, 154 (2007). The same may be said of a minister's public endorsement of a

candidate.
167. 435 U.S. 618, 618 (1978).
168. Id. at 629.
169. Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion.
See id. at 618.
170. Id. at 622-25.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 629.
173. Id. at626.
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thus pitting one against the others, contrary to the anti-establishment principle
with its command of neutrality. However widely that view may have been held in
the 18th century by many, including enlightened statesmen of that day, the
American experience provides no persuasive support for the fear that clergymen in
public office will be less careful of anti-establishment interests or less faithful to
their oaths of civil office than their unordained counterparts. 74
The Paty plurality opinion rejects the notion that "clergymen in public office will be
less careful of anti-establishment interests" than anyone else. 175 Surely, one would be
hard-pressed to argue that a non-clergyman endorsed by one or more churches "will be
less careful of anti-establishment interests" than anyone else. A minister's duty to act in
accordance with his or her calling is not confined to the church, synagogue, mosque, or
temple. If a commitment to separation of church and state does not require us to doubt
the ability of a church-ordained minister to respect the separation norm while serving
in public office, it makes little sense to question the ability of others to do so merely
because they were supported by one or more churches. 17 6 If Paty is right, the
Triumphant Establishment Assumption is dead wrong.
In summary, all three assumptions that arguably support Normative HyperSeparationism are suspect. Collectively or individually, they (1) fail to account for
provisions of current law that undermine the role that the ban is perceived to serve; (2)
fail to account for political, religious, and institutional realities that exist despite the
ban; or (3) fail to appreciate how government does and should function in faithfully
observing the separation norm.
V. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

A commitment to separation of church and state, properly understood in the context
of the First Amendment and our nation's history and political ideals, is laudable. This
Article recognizes that the separation norm should inform public policies that impel
law, including federal tax law. However, this acknowledgment does not imply that the
separation norm justifies the effective ban on electioneering by religious organizations.
Upon close examination, neither constitutionally-grounded arguments, nor arguments
grounded in normative policy goals explain why a commitment to separation ofchurch
and state supports the ban as applied to churches. To the contrary, the separation norm
counsels against the ban.
The implications of the analysis of this Article are extremely important to the future
of political speech generally and religious political speech specifically. As the IRS
continues its efforts to enforce the ban through expanded examinations of churches and
other charities, one can expect many in the charitable sector to react negatively to the
heightened governmental intrusions into their affairs. Leaders and supporters of the
nonprofit sector may well conclude that the ban unnecessarily chills political speech
and thereafter pressure legislators to relax the ban. To determine what reforms are
appropriate, lawmakers will likely seek to obtain a firmer grasp of the rationales for
limiting the political voice of churches and non-sectarian charities. The debate on how

174. Id. at 628-29 (internal citation and footnote omitted).
175. Id. at 629.
176. Buckles, A Reply, supra note 18, at 1085-86.
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best to protect the integrity of charitable institutions without unduly stifling their voices
on matters of public policy will be most productive only when the country identifies
the truly compelling rationales for limiting the political speech of churches and other §
501(c)(3) entities.
The legal literature has generated several reasons to reject unabridged
electioneering by § 501(c)(3) entities, including churches.177 Some of these reasons are
plausible. However, this country's long-standing commitment to separation of church
and state is not one of them. To justify the ban on the ill-conceived notion that it finds
support in the separation norm is to hinder prospects for reforming current law, which
excessively restricts the charitable sector's voice in matters of public policy. 78 This
erroneous invocation of the separation norm clouds the real issues, perhaps even
eroding respect for the norm by those who have repeatedly heard that they should not
publicly express their most deeply held religious convictions that relate to public life
because of the "separation of church and state."
Enough is enough. Let us reject the unfounded, illogical, and counterproductive
assertion that a commitment to separation of church and state explains the ban of §
501(c)(3). Once this assertion is eradicated, the nation can seriously undertake the task
of reforming the regulation of political speech of churches and other charities through
federal tax law.

177. For an analysis of several rationales for the ban as applied to charities, see Buckles, Not
Even a Peep?, supra note 18, at 1078-95. See also Chisolm, supra note 18, at 337-52.
178. For a brief discussion of why religious and other charitable organizations should be
permitted to engage in some degree of partisan political speech without suffering tax penalties,
see Buckles, Not Even a Peep?, supranote 18, at 1095-97.

